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DETECTING DISPARATE-IMPACT
DISCRIMINATION IN THE BIG-DATA

ERA
John Yinger*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The terms at the core of this paper are well known: A business practice has a "disparate impact" if it is applied to every customer but leads to poorer outcomes for one legally protected class
than for another. This impact becomes "disparate-impact discrimination," which is illegal, if this disparate impact cannot be justified on the basis of "business necessity." In this context, a business
practice can be labeled a "necessity" if it furthers a legitimate business interest. Disparate-impact discrimination contrasts with "disparate-treatment discrimination," which arises when businesses
use less-favorable rules for people in legally protected classes. An
effective civil rights enforcement system must be able to detect and
combat both types of discrimination.
This paper provides an economist's view of disparate-impact discrimination, explains why outlawing disparate-impact discrimination is such an important feature of civil rights law enforcement, reviews the recent debate about the regulations for enforcing
the prohibition against disparate-impact discrimination, and
makes some recommendations for federal anti-discrimination policy. The focus is on disparate-impact discrimination that may arise
in the actions of large lenders, large landlords, or other businesses
that have measurable objectives and deal with many customers.1
* This paper was prepared for the symposium on "Racial Justice in Consumer
Law" sponsored by the Loyola University Chicago School of Law and its Consumer Law Review, March 4-5, 2021. John Yinger is a professor of economics
and public administration at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
1
Although disparate-impact discrimination may also arise in labor markets,
home insurance markets, and automobile loans, these markets have special features that are beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Solon Baroca & Andrew
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Many court decisions have supported the application of
civil rights laws to disparate-impact discrimination. An important
recent example is the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project(Inclusive Communities), which affirmed that the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) covers disparate-impact discrimination.2
As in other types of civil rights enforcement, the courts also play a
crucial role in guiding the details of enforcement actions involving
disparate-impact discrimination. This paper focuses on the broad
issues involved in these actions, but does not, for the most part,
review the legal details.
II.

WHAT IS DISPARATE DISCR-IMINATION AND
WHY DOES IT ARISE? 3

An analysis of disparate-impact discrimination begins with
the observation that many types of business decisions are guided
by a prediction about the outcome of that decision based on the
traits of the customer involved at the time the decision is made.
Lenders predict the probability that a mortgagor will default, for
example, and landlords predict whether a particular tenant will

D. Selbst, Big Data'sDisparateImpact, 104 CAL L. REv. 671 (2016) (on labor
markets); Latonia Williams, African American Homeownership and the Dream
Deferred: A DisparateImpact Argument against the Use of Credit Scores in
Homeownership Insurance Underwriting, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 295 (2008-2009)
(on home insurance markets); Mark A. Cohen, Imperfect Competition in Auto
Lending: Subjective Markup, RacialDisparity, and Class Action Litigation, 8
REV. OF L. & ECON. 21 (2012) (on automobile loans).
2 Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507 (2015). See also Robert G. Schwemm. FairHousingLitigation After
Inclusive Communities: What's New and What's Not, 115 COL. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 206 (2015) (for the impact of Inclusive Communities on fair housing
cases); Winnie F. Taylor, The ECOA and DisparateImpact Theory: A HistoricalPerspective, 26 J. OF L. & POL'Y 575 (2018) (for an analysis of the applicability of the Equal Credit and Opportunity Act to disparate-impact discrimination).
' The analysis in Sections 2 and 3 draws heavily on Stephen L. Ross & John
Yinger, Uncovering Discrimination:A Comparison of the Methods Used by
Scholars and Civil Rights Enforcement Officials, 8 AMER. L. & ECON. REv. 562
(2006) and STEPHEN L. ROss & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT:
MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND
FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT (MIT Press, 2002). These references provide a

more rigorous and complete version of this analysis.
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pay his rent on time. The transaction is completed or its terms are
favorable if and only if the customer's predicted "performance" is
deemed satisfactory. A business predicts a customer's future behavior based on the observed performance of comparable customers in the past. If a business's customer base is sufficiently large,
the predicted performance of current customers is based on a statistical analysis of the performance of past customers. Some of the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations described in Section 4 call this an "algorithmic" model.
This type of model is often matched with business practices based
on technological innovations, called FinTech, such as mortgage
underwriting over the internet and the use of non-traditional data.
This type of statistical analysis identifies a "weight" to be
placed on each customer trait and leads to a "score" for each customer defined as a weighted average of all their relevant traits.
When a business has many customers and the data it uses to obtain
customer scores are available, an enforcement agency can determine, using methods discussed in Section 3, whether the business
engages in either disparate-treatment or disparate-impact discrimination. Of course, these conditions often are not met, and a civil
rights enforcement agency must develop methods to detect discrimination for small businesses and with limited data. Although
this paper focuses on detecting discrimination when many traits
are observed for many past customers, some of the key lessons apply to other circumstances, as well.
Consider the following stylized analysis of a business decision, D, such as the decision to grant someone a mortgage loan or
rent someone an apartment. The framework developed here also
can be applied to a decision about the term of a mortgage loan or
of an apartment lease. A business makes this decision based on the
observable traits of the customer, such as her income, and of the
transaction, such as the loan-to-value ratio. Let X indicate the set
of traits a business uses to make decision D. The business places a
weight on each of the X variables to obtain a score for each customer.4 The higher the score, the more favorable the decision from
the customer's point of view. The business determines these
weights by observing which traits in X best predict the business's
preferred outcome as observed in previous transactions. In the
case of a mortgage lender, for example, the preferred outcome is
likely to be a low probability of loan default within the first four or
4 A credit score is an example of a "score" as the term is used here, but the
definition in this paper is more general.

2021]

Disparate-ImpactDiscriminationin Big-DataEra

389

five years after the loan was granted.' Let P measure the "performance" of a transaction, defined as the extent to which the transaction meets the business's goals. Then the weight for each X in
determining a current customer's score is the coefficient of that X
in a statistical analysis of P as a function of the Xs. In other words,
the weight placed on a given X in a current transaction equals the
statistically determined impact of that X on the firm's performance goals as seen in past transactions. The required statistical
analysis could be conducted by the business itself or by an appropriate third party.
This framework leads to precise definitions of disparatetreatment and disparate-impact discrimination. Disparate-treatment discrimination exists when membership in a legally protected
class, say M, is one of the variables included in X and the weighted
value of M (based on a statistical procedure) is included in a customer's score. For example, a landlord cannot use a scheme in
which a white customer is offered an apartment but a black customer with identical traits is not.
A necessary condition for disparate-impact discrimination
to arise is that the scoring scheme on which a business makes its
decisions diverges from the best-possible scoring scheme based on
available information. This divergence is undoubtedly favorable
to some customers and unfavorable to others. This condition is not
sufficient, however, because the customers who are treated less favorably may not belong to any legally protected class. The obvious
sufficient condition is that the business's deviations from the bestpossible scoring scheme place a burden on a protected class-even
though those deviations apply to all customers.
Suppose, for example, that the best-possible scoring scheme
to guide a landlord's rental decisions includes all an applicant's
income, with the same weight on income from full-time and parttime jobs. Now suppose that Hispanics are more likely to have
part-time work than Anglos, and that a particular landlord uses a
scoring scheme that includes the share of income from part-time
work. Even if this scheme is used for all customers, it places Hispanic applicants at a disadvantage and constitutes disparate-impact discrimination.

s As discussed by Robert Bartlett, Adair Morse, Richard Stanton & Nancy
Wallace, Consumer-LendingDiscriminationin the FinTech Era(Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25943, 2019), the courts have consistently
ruled out profit as an appropriate performance measure for lenders. After all,
as discussed below, discrimination may be profitable under some circumstances.
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One key point to preview is that disparate-impact discrimination cannot be detected unless the decisions made by a business
can be compared to the decisions that would be made with the
"best possible" scoring scheme. For the purposes of this paper, the
best possible scoring scheme is the one developed by an enforcement agency using data supplied by the business (and perhaps
other data if they are available) and the most appropriate statistical methods. The enforcement agency needs to observe the business's screening and pricing decisions, but it does not need to know
the business's scoring scheme. In the standard framework in federal regulations, a business accused of disparate-impact discrimination against a given protected class has the right to show that its
own scheme leads to more favorable outcome for the protected
class than does the scheme developed by the enforcement agency.
The logic of disparate-impact discrimination can be applied
not just to the inclusion in a scoring scheme of inappropriate traits,
such as the share of income from part-time work in the above hypothetical example, but also to traits that are given the "wrong"
weight, that is, a weight not associated with the best available scoring scheme. Suppose, for example, that the enforcement agency's
scoring scheme based on its own statistical analysis finds that income from part-time work and income from full-time work have
the same regression coefficient in the performance regression and
hence the same weight in the enforcement agency's scoring
scheme. With more part-time work among Hispanics, therefore, a
scoring scheme that weights income from a part-time job at half
the weight of income from a full-time job would constitute disparate-impact discrimination against Hispanics.
Disparate-impact discrimination also can arise when the
statistical analysis linking customer performance, P, to customer
and transaction traits, X, omits variables for group membership,
M. At first glance, this appears to be a contradiction. How can
including group membership in a statistical analysis help to prevent discrimination? The answer to this question is a based on a
statistical concept known as "omitted variable bias." When a variable with explanatory power is omitted from a regression then the
coefficient of each included variable is biased, and the bias is proportional to the correlation between the included and omitted variables.6 -When M is omitted, therefore, the coefficients of all
6 This type of bias is not confined to the case of linear regression. It also
arises with logit or probit regressions and to models developed through data
mining. See, e.g., Scott Menard, An Introduction to Logistic Regression
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included variables that are correlated with M are biased-and so
are the scoring weights based on those coefficients. As shown in the
previous paragraph, inaccurate weights such as these, can be a
source of disparate-impact discrimination. To avoid disparate-impact discrimination, therefore, a statistical analysis of the relationship between customer performance, P, and observed traits, X,
should include minority status in the regression as an element of
X, but should (to avoid disparate-treatment discrimination) ignore
M in calculating the associated customers' scores.'
One final point about this economic framework is that it
does not depend on the distinction between intended and unintended discrimination. This distinction is important in the context
of a trial because direct evidence of intent, which always strengthens a case against an alleged discriminator, is often missing in a
disparate-impact case. This distinction is not appropriate in a conceptual framework for discriminatory behavior, however. As I use
the terms, disparate-treatment discrimination can be unintended
and disparate-impact discrimination can be intentional.'
Moreover, a business may have an economic incentive to
practice disparate-impact discrimination. Suppose, for example,
that (1) a lender cannot observe whether a loan applicant has family members who can bail her out if she gets into financial trouble
and (2) in the pool of applicants available to this lender blacks are
less likely than whites to have this financial backstop. Under these

Diagnostics, APPLIED

LOGISTIC

REGRESSION . ANALYSIS

(2011).

(DOI:

https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412983433 , p. 3.)
' In a review of Ross, supra note 3, Cynthea E. Geerdes, Now You See It,
Now You Don't: When Color-Conscious Means Color-Blind, 13 J. OF
AFFORDABLE HoUs. & CMTY DEV. LAW 176, 177 (2004) restated this point in a
particularly clear way: "The framework they construct ... leads them to devise
a new, startling, counterintuitive method for preventing most mortgage discrimination in loan approval. Basically, the method requires that minority status first
be included as a variable in the underwriting model and then subsequently be
discounted on average. In the context of automated underwriting, their goal is
to achieve a self-correcting system in which all hidden bias towards minorities
can be removed."
8 A striking example of intentional disparate-impact discrimination is provided by Valerie Schneider, In Defense of DisparateImpact: Urban Redevelop-

ment and the Supreme Court'sRecent Interestin the FairHousingAct, 79 Mo.
L. REv. 539 (2014). To keep African-Americans who had been displaced by Hurricane Katrina from moving back to St. Bernard Parish, which is adjacent to
New Orleans, the Parish passed an ordinance that restricted property owners in
the Parish (who were mostly white) to renting only to their own blood relatives.
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circumstances, the lender can make more accurate predictions of a
customer's probability of loan default if it includes in its credit
scoring scheme variables that are highly correlated with race. In
other words, this business can increase its profits without practicing disparate-treatment discrimination by designing a scoring
scheme that includes variables predicting a customer's race instead
of actually including race in the scheme. 9 This behavior is an example of "statistical discrimination," which arises when an economic agent uses group membership to account for a variable that
helps to predict business objectives but cannot be observed directly.'o
More generally, any economic actor who wants to discriminate can design a disparate-impact discrimination scheme that
yields the same, or almost the same, economic outcomes as a disparate-treatment discrimination scheme, but with a lower probability of being caught. Disparate-impact schemes rely on the correlation between membership in a protected class and customer
traits that are plausibly related to customer "quality." This nation's
history of oppression against certain groups has resulted in many
such traits. As a result, an enforcement agency must be prepared
to identify cases of disparate-impact discrimination that coincide
with statistical discrimination.
Several recent studies provide evidence that discrimination
persists in housing and mortgage markets." One study of

Henry Buist, Peter Linneman, & Isaac F. Megbolugbe. ResidentialLending Discriminationand Lender Compensation Policies, 27 J. OF THE AMER.
REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASSN. 695 (1999),
10 The concept of statistical discrimination was introduced by Kenneth J.
Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination;see ORLEY ASHENFELTER & ALBERT
REEs, DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (Princeton Univ. Press 1973); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 659 (1972).
" Studies that document ongoing discrimination in housing and mortgage
markets include: Sun Jung Oh & John Yinger, What Have We Learned from
Paired Testing in Housing Markets?, 17 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL'Y DEV. AND
RES. 15 (2015) (reviewing extensive evidence of discrimination in housing based
on the paired-testing methodology); Andrew Hanson, Zachary Hawley, Hal
Martin & Bo Liu, Discriminationin Mortgage Lending: Evidence from a Correspondence Experiment, 92 J. OF URB. ECON. 48 (2016) (finding evidence of
discrimination by mortgage loan originators based on a paired testing study);
Ann Choi, Keith Herbert, & Olivia Winslow, Long IslandDivided, NEWSDAY
(Nov. 17, 2019) (reporting on housing discrimination found in paired tests conducted on Long Island); Patrick Bayer, Fernando Ferreira, & Stephen L. Ross,
9
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particular relevance here, Bartlet et al., 2 examines discrimination
in the setting of interest rates by lenders who sell their loans to
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (Government Sponsored Enterprises
or GSEs). From the lender's point of view, the GSEs fully insure
each loan for a fee that is based on the loan's loan-to-value ratio
and the borrower's credit score. As a result, a higher interest rate
for black or Hispanic customers controlling for these two factors is
an indication of discrimination. This study estimates that discrimination in interest rate setting on home-purchase and refinancing
loans costs African-American and Hispanic borrowers $765 million per year.13 The level of discrimination is somewhat lower for
lenders classified as "FinTech" than for others.

III.

How TO DETECT DISPARATE-IMPACT
DISCRIMINATION

The Bureau of Consumer Finance Protection (CFPB) are
responsible for the regulations that implement the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA). These regulations, called Regulation B,
provide a clear definition of disparate-impact discrimination. 4
Moreover, they define an "empirically derived, demonstrably and
statistically sound, credit scoring system," which is the type of system discussed in this paper.15 In addition, these regulations
acknowledge that "neutral factors used in credit scoring systems
could nonetheless be subject to challenge under the effects test"
which is another name for a test to find disparate-impact discrimination.' 6 Regulation B does not say anything, however, about the
steps a regulator needs to take to determine whether a lender using
this type of credit-scoring system is practicing disparate-impact
discrimination.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) is responsible for regulations to implement FHA. 7 These
regulations also provide a detailed definition of disparate-impact
What Drives RacialandEthnic Differences in High-CostMortgages? The Role
of High-Risk Lenders, 31 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 175 (2018) (finding that AfricanAmerican and Hispanic customers are more likely than equally qualified white
customers to be steered to high-cost loans).
12

13

Bartlett, supranote 5.

Id at 15.

14 Equal Credit Opportunity Act - Regulation B, 12 C.F.R.

" 12 C.F.R.
16

§ 1002 (1974).

§ 1002.2 (2011).

Id

17 Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R.

§ 100.
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discrimination. The 2013 version of these rules set out a three-part
process for a court case in which disparate-impact discrimination
was alleged. 18 (Newer rules, which are not yet implemented, are
discussed below.) First, the plaintiff (i.e., the party alleging discrimination) had to establish that a practice had a disparate impact
on people in a protected class. If the plaintiff was successful in
making this prima facie case, the burden of proof shifted to the
defendant. To offset the prima facie case, the defendant had to establish that the practice in question was necessary to achieve the
defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory objectives. If this
"business necessity" was established, the burden of proof returned
to the plaintiff, who could still prevail if it could identify an alternative practice that was consistent with the defendant's "business
necessity" but has a smaller disparate impact on the plaintiff. This
is a compelling framework but these regulations do not provide
clear guidance about the methods required to test for disparateimpact discrimination in the case of a statistically based scoring
scheme for credit or for housing decisions.
Although a test for disparate-impact discrimination does
not appear in the federal regulations, even for the case of a datarich environment, tests of this type are available. One type of test
is presented by Ross and Yinger.1 9 Another comes from a simple
extension of the analysis in Bartlett et al. 20
With the appropriate data, the five steps identified by Ross
and Yinger rigorously identify disparate-treatment and disparateimpact discrimination. These steps are:
1. Gather data on applicant and transaction traits for a
large sample of individuals who interacted with a
given business, presumably a business suspected of
practicing disparate-impact discrimination or a business that has been randomly selected for investigation.2 ' These traits must include the applicant's
la HUD's Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Disparate Impact

Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11, 460 (Feb. 15, 2013). A more formal discussion of the
2013 rules can be found in Leah Powers, The UncertainFutureofthe FairHousing Act: HUD's Recent Changes to DisparateImpact Standard, 74 SMU L.
REV. F. 29 (2021).
19 Ross and Yinger (2002), supranote 3.
20 Bartlett et al., supra note
5.
21 An enforcement agency also could conduct its statistical procedures with
pooled data and then extract the results for a single business. See Ross and
Yinger (2002), supra note 3.
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membership in a legally protected class. The data set
also should include whether the individual was
served by the business and/or the key terms of this
service, such as the interest rate or monthly rental. Finally, the data set should follow each individual for
several years to measure his or her performance, such
as whether that individual was late on a rent payment.

2. The second step is to randomly divide the sample of
individual into two parts, say A and B.
3. The third step is for the civil rights enforcement
agency to develop its own statistical model of the way
individual and transaction characteristics observed at
the time of transaction influence the individual's performance for several years following the transaction.
This model should be estimated for one of the two
samples, say, sample A. To conduct this step the enforcement agency must invest in knowledge about the
underlying behavior. What have scholars learned, for
example, about the impact of factors observed at the
time of loan origination on the likelihood that a customer will default within five years? The agency also
needs to invest in knowledge about which statistical
formulation best predicts individual behavior as a
function of these factors. To avoid the omitted variable bias discussed earlier, this model must include
variables to indicate a customer's membership in various protected classes."
4. The fourth step is to use the results of step three, such
as regression coefficients, to obtain a score for each
individual in sample B. To keep the analog to disparate-treatment discrimination out of the regulator's
model, this score obviously must not include the
22 Barocas and Selbst, supranote 1 at 243, conclude that "there is no obvious

way to determine how correlated a relevant attribute must be with class membership to be worrisome. Nor is there a self-evident way to determine when an
attribute is sufficiently relevant to justify its consideration, despite its high correlation with class membership." When a measure of performance is available,
however, an obvious way exists: include minority status in the scoring regression.
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individual's membership in any protected class. In effect, regression coefficients of the protected class variables should be estimated in step 3 and then set to
zero in step 4. These individuals must then be ranked
according to their score.
5. The fifth step takes one of two forms, depending on
the nature of the decision under investigation. First
consider the case of a screening decision by a business,
that is, a decision about whether to serve a given customer. The decision to approve a mortgage is an example. The enforcement agency can observe the
number of individuals served in sample B, say NB,
and the minority share of those served individuals.
This share can then be compared to the minority
share of the NB highest-ranking individuals according
to the enforcement agency's scores, which are determined in step 4. A significantly higher minority share
for the individual's ranked using the agency's scores
than the minority share in actual loans is evidence of
discrimination. This discrimination could be either
disparate-treatment or disparate-impact. These two
types of discrimination cannot be distinguished without knowledge of the business's scoring model.
The second form for this test applies when the terms of a
transaction, such as an interest rate or a security deposit, are being
examined. In this case the test, again based on sample B, is to regress the relevant term on minority-status variables and the
agency's score for each individual. A significant coefficient for the
minority status variable is evidence of discrimination. 3 Again, disparate-treatment and disparate-impact cannot be separately identified.
A key feature of these steps is that they do not require information about the business's decision rules. It is, of course, possible that the business has a better non-discriminatory model to
predict customer performance than the one devised by the enforcement agency. A business should always be given the chance to
show that this is true. They might be able to show, for example,
that the agency's model leaves out a legitimate variable that has a
" Discrimination often takes the form of a higher interest rate or a higher
security deposit, so a positive sign for a minority status variable indicates discrimination in these cases.
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major impact on the scores of many individuals and that including
this variable in the agency's model eliminates the difference in minority shares between the agency and business models-and hence
the evidence of discrimination. Of course, the business must reveal
its own model in order to make this type of claim.24
This method was applied to the pricing decisions of a large
lender in California and Florida by Ghent et al. 25 This study found
that the "upper bound for the effect of adverse pricing based on the
borrower's race that is not due to differences in prepayment or default behavior is 29 basis points, the adverse pricing faced by
blacks in 30-year ARMs. An increase in the interest rate of 29 basis
points translates into an increase in the monthly payment of $57.57
or 3% of the payment" (p. 208).26
One complexity in contemporary credit markets is that disparate-impact discrimination could operate through "channels."
As explained by White,2 7 "It appears that within a large financial
institution ... , mortgage prices for borrowers with similar credit
scores and qualifications vary widely according to channels and
products. It is as if a store charged higher prices for customers coming in the east door than those coming in the west door, and somehow directed most minority customers to the east door. While it is
conceivable that a lender ... could offer cost-driven business justifications for charging different prices for loans made through different channels (e.g., broker versus retail) it is hard to see how a
lender could support selling the same product-adjustable rate first
" If a firm decides to reveal its underwriting model, then an enforcement

agency can separate disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination.
25 Andra C. Ghent, Rub6n Hernandez-Murillo & Michael T. Owyang, Differences in Subprime Loan Pricingacross Races and Neighborhoods, 48 REG.
SCL & URBAN ECON. 199 (2014).
26 Robert B. Avery, Kenneth Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, Does Credit
Scoring Producea DisparateImpact?, 40 REAL EST. ECON. S65 (2012) (develop
a model to generate individual credit scores and find that the credit scores obtained from their model are virtually the same when estimated with or without
racial and ethnic fixed effects and when estimated for the white, non-Hispanic
sample alone. As they point out, however, "Perhaps the most important [limitation] is that the analysis is based upon a credit history scoring model that was
developed specifically for this study and not upon a commercially available
score" (p. S113). In other words, they skip step 5 in the procedure developed
above, and therefore cannot draw conclusions about disparate-impact discrimination in commercial credit scores).
27 Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying FairLending Laws to
Risk-Based MortgagePricing,60 SOUTH CAR. L. REv. 677, 698 (2009).

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

398

[Vol. 33:2

lien subprime refinance mortgages-at different prices using different names by business necessity." An application of the five above
steps should capture discrimination in these cases, if it exists. 28
A straightforward extension of the method in Bartlett et
al., 2 9 provides an alternative test for lenders who sell their loans to
a GSE. Bartlett et al. measure discrimination based on regression
of borrower's interest rate on fixed effects for each risk category
identified by the GSE and a variable to indicate membership in a
protect class (African-American or Hispanic in their study). The
coefficient of the protected class variable indicates the extent of
discriminatory interest rates in the average transaction. Although
Bartlett et al. do not point this out, their approach can be turned
into a test for pricing discrimination by a single lender by limiting
the sample to loans by a single lender or by interacting a fixed effect for each lender with the minority-status variable. Of course,
these fixed effects only lead to meaningful results for large lenders.
IV.

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S CHANGES TO
HUD REGULATIONS

The 2013 HUD regulations concerning disparate-impact
discrimination posted by the Obama Administration 30 did not sit
well with the Trump Administration, and on August 19, 2019,
HUD proposed a different set of rules to guide the enforcement of
cases based on disparate-impact discrimination.3 1 These rules include a section on the use of "algorithmic models."
HUD claimed that "[t]his section is not intended to provide
a special exemption for parties who use algorithmic models, but
merely to recognize that additional guidance is necessary in response to the complexity of disparate-impact cases challenging

Although it does not estimate discrimination by individual lenders, the
study by Bayer, Ferriera, and Ross (supranote 11 at 200) "identified large racial
and ethnic differences in the likelihood of receiving a rate spread mortgage in
the home purchase market after controlling for detailed borrower and loan attributes. Differential sorting across lenders and the differential treatment of
equally qualified borrowers by the same lender both emerge as important drivers of market-wide differences."
29 Bartlett et al., supra note 5.
30 HUD's Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11, 460 (Feb. 15, 2013).
31 HUD's Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Disparate Impact
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42, 854 (Aug. 9, 2019).
28
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these models."3 From my point of view, however, the rules in this
section would have made it virtually impossible for any plaintiff to
prevail on a disparate-impact claim involving an "algorithmic
model."
HUD summarized the proposed new rules on the use of algorithms as follows:"
Paragraph ( c)(2) provides that, where a plaintiff identifies an offending policy or practice that relies on an algorithmic model, a defending party may defeat the claim
by: (i) Identifying the inputs used in the model and showing that these inputs are not substitutes for a protected
characteristic and that the model is predictive of risk or
other valid objectives; (ii) showing that a recognized third
party, not the defendant, is responsible for creating or
maintaining the model; or (iii) showing that a neutral
third party has analyzed the model in question and determined it was empirically derived, its inputs are not substitutes for a protected characteristic, and is a demonstrably and statistically sound algorithm.
Although these rules address legitimate issues, they are
meaningless as written. Almost any input is correlated with protected characteristics, but no input is literally a substitute for any
one of these characteristics. A plaintiff obviously cannot succeed if
success requires showing something that never occurs. Moreover,
membership in a protected class is often "predictive of risk," so
making evidence of this prediction a valid defense opens the door
for discriminatory practices. The role of third parties is equally
vague.
The procedure for identifying disparate-impact discrimination in Section 3 recognizes, of course, that potential inputs into a
scoring system may be correlated with a protected characteristic
and that a defendant has the right to develop a scoring system that
is consistent with business necessity. However, the method in that
section is based on a formal consideration of these two issues-not
the inappropriate rules in these proposed amendments.

32

Id. at 42, 859.
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HUD received 45,758 comments on these proposed rules
and altered them significantly.3 4 The "final" rules were posted on
September 24, 2020 to be effective a month later. The 2020 rules
dropped the provisions in the 2019 proposed provisions on "algorithmic models." The explanation was that
HUD expects that there will be further development in
the law in the emerging technology area of algorithms,
artificial intelligence, machine learning and similar concepts. Thus, it is premature at this time to more directly
35
address algorithms.
Although the troubling provisions concerning algorithmic
models were dropped from the 2020 rules, other changes undermined HUD's ability to combat disparate-impact discrimination.
As Powers puts it
Although the 2020 Rule arguably finds textual support in
the language of Inclusive Communities for several of its
five elements, HUD made the deliberate choice to go beyond the Court's language-in crafting its new standard.
By heightening the plaintiff's burden even further than
required by the Court's ruling and providing advantageous new defenses for defendants, HUD has greatly reduced the effectiveness of disparate impact liability as a
tool to fight housing discrimination. 36
Both versions of the Trump Administrations rules also add
a new paragraph: "Nothing in this part requires or encourages the
collection of data with respect to race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin."" Given the important role
of group membership variables in a test for disparate-impact discrimination, this paragraph would be an unfortunate addition to
the HUD regulations.

V.

LESSONS FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

The word final is in quotation marks in the previous paragraph, because "the U.S. District Court for the District of
" HUD's Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Disparate Impact
Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. 60, 288 (Sept. 24, 2020).
35

Id at 60, 290.

Powers, supra note 18, at 54.
" HUD, supranote 18, at § 100.5(d).
36
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Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction staying the implementation of the 2020 Rule on October 25, 2020-just one day before the rule was scheduled to take effect." 3 8 Then, on January 26,
2021, President Biden issued a memorandum expressing his commitment to fair housing and calling on the Secretary of HUD to "as
soon as practicable, take all steps necessary to examine the effects
of" the rules posted by HUD in September, 2020."9
The analysis in this paper leads to several recommendations for the Biden Administration's fair housing policies. First,
this analysis supports the conclusion in Powers:
In light of the broad remedial intent of the FHA, the core
mission of HUD to eradicate housing discrimination,
decades of disparate impact precedent, various negative
consequences of the new standard, and President Biden's
recent memorandum on housing discrimination, HUD
should abandon the 2020 Rule and readopt the 2013
Rule. 0
In addition, it does not appear "premature" to me for HUD and
CFPB to investigate changes in their rules designed to strengthen
their disparate-impact discrimination enforcement powers given
the growth in big data, algorithmic models, and FinTech methods.
Second, the available evidence suggests that federal fair
housing and fair lending enforcement agencies should take the possibility of disparate-impact discrimination more seriously. The
available public record does not indicate the extent to which fair
housing and fair lending enforcement officials explored disparateimpact issues in their examinations and investigations. However,
the annual fair lending and enforcement reports by CFPB, HUD's
Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, and The Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division do not mention any cases during the last five years that involve disparate-impact discrimination.4 1 This lack of disparate-impact cases appears to be in conflict

38

The quotation is from Powers, supra note 18 at 52. The case is Mass. Fair

Hous. Ctr. v. US. Dep't ofHous. & Urb. Dev., No. 20-11765, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 205633, at 1 (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2020).
39 Memorandum on Redressing Our Nation's and the Federal Government's History of DiscriminatoryHousing Practicesand Policies, 2021 DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 202100090, at 2 (Jan. 26, 2021).
4 Powers, supra note 18, at 54.
41 See FairLending Report of the Bureau of Consumer FinanceProtection,
CONSUMER

FIN.

PROT.

BUREAU

(2019),
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with the scholarly evidence that racial and ethnic discrimination
persists.
Third, the civil rights enforcement agencies in the federal
government, particularly HUD and CFPB, must recognize that
they have a unique responsibility to develop the expertise necessary to enforce FHA and ECOA in an era of big data and elaborate
42
scoring systems. This point also has been made by Gano, who
writes:
that there is simply no substitute for governmental oversight and enforcement of fair lending laws. Disparate impact cases in the mortgage lending context often involve
thousands (and in some recent cases ... hundreds of thousands) of borrowers spread across the country. The evidence is complex and consists of millions of data points
contained in reports submitted to and reviewed by federal financial regulators. Individual plaintiffs-and even
state attorneys general and national nonprofits-quite
simply lack the expertise and economic wherewithal to
pursue these claims. If we are to "provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States," the federal government must continue to
play a leading role.
Fourth, HUD and CFPB must recognize that the enforcement of these civil rights laws requires combining existing data
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/?topics=fairlending; FHEO Annual Report on Fair Housing, HUD.GOV (2019),
https://www.hud.gov/program-offices/fair_housingequal_opp/annualreport;
(2020)
HUD.GOV
Activity,
Enforcement
Housing
Fair
https://www.hud.gov/program-offices/fair_housingequal_opp/enforcement;
The Attorney General's2019 AnnualReport to CongressPursuantto the Equal
Credit OpportunityActAmendments of 1976, THE U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST. (2019),
The Federal Reserve
https://www.justice.gov/crt/fair-lending-program-0.
Board does not publish an annual fair lending report. The only mention of a
case involving disparate-impact discrimination that I could find on the Federal
Reserve Board web site was a 2015 case involving fees and pricing, which was
voluntarily settled by the lender. See Carol A. Evans, The Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Keeping Fintech Fair: Thinking About Fair Lending and UDAP Risks.
CONSUMER COMPLIANCE OUTLOOK (2017), https://www.frbsf.org/bank-

ing/files/Fintech-Lending-Fair-Lending-and-UDAp-Risks.pdf.
42 Alex Gano, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A Beginner's

Guide, 88 UNIV.

OF COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1116 (2017).
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sets. As explained by Ross and Yinger,4 3 existing data sets for both
research and enforcement generally do not contain all the information needed to test for disparate-impact discrimination by a
large business or a set of large businesses. Data sets designed for
research, for example, often consist of a sample of individuals without identification of the businesses with which these individuals
deal. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data set collected by HUD does identify lenders, but it does not follow individual borrowers over time so it cannot provide individual performance information." The study by Ghent et al. 45 collected the data
necessary to test for disparate-impact discrimination by one large
lender. Avery et al. 46 and Bartlett4 7 provide examples of the extensive efforts that are required to assemble the type of data needed
to test for disparate-impact discrimination while preserving individual and business confidentiality. Any serious effort to test for
disparate-impact discrimination by large businesses requires the
Federal Reserve Board, CFPB, HUD, and other agencies with
civil rights enforcement authority to find ways to build the required large data sets. Guidelines concerning the creation of such
data sets would make a valuable addition to policies concerning
disparate-impact discrimination.
Rigorous tests for disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination need to have information on membership in
protected classes. Federal regulations regarding ECOA and
HMDA require businesses to collect this information under many
circumstances, including for fair lending enforcement. 8 Any move
to weaken these requirements would constitute a serious blow to
the ability of civil rights enforcement agencies to detect both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination. The paragraph in HUD's 2020 rules eliminating any requirement to collect
Ross and Yinger (2006), supra note 3, at 584-85.
" A report by the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (FairLending:
Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. FinancialRegulatory Structure
Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts, Report GAO-09-704
(2009)) explores the strengths and limitations of the HMDA data for fair lending
enforcement. This report also discusses the weaknesses of the fair lending enforcement system before the founding of the CFPB.
* Ghent et al., supranote 25.
46 Avery et al., supra note 26. The data for this study were collected under
the auspices of the Federal Reserve Board.
47 Bartlett et al., supra note 5.
48 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B) Ethnicity and Race Information Collection, 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 680 (Oct. 3, 2017); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.13 (2018).
4
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these data should clearly be repealed. Instead, federal policy makers should make certain that data on race and ethnicity are collected whenever required for civil rights enforcement. Any data
collection efforts should, of course, be accompanied by rules to
make certain that businesses supplying the information do not
have an opportunity to use it for discriminatory purposes. 49
Fifth, the civil rights enforcement agencies should develop
expertise in models of customer performance. A full evaluation of
a business's business-necessity claims, which are inevitably based
on its own customer-performance model, requires a comparison
with an alternative model developed by the enforcement agency.
Recall step 5 of the method in Section 3. This step determines
whether outcomes for various protected classes are less favorable
with the business's decision rules than with a decision rule based
on the agency's scoring model. As in the case of data assembly, the
studies by Ghent et al., 50Avery et al., 51 and Bartlett et al.5" reveal
the type of modelling efforts in which an enforcement agency must
engage. Revised policies by HUD and CFPB should validate enforcement efforts of this kind.
Overall, the federal civil rights enforcement agencies for
lending and housing appear to have avoided enforcement actions
involving potential disparate-impact discrimination by large businesses. The analysis in this paper indicates that these agencies
should take this possibility more seriously by developing regulations and policies to facilitate such enforcement actions in the future.
Four principal arguments support this conclusion.
(1) Given our nation's history, membership in a legally
protected class often conveys negative information about
a customer that a business cannot observe directly.' In
this case, the business may have an incentive to

49 This importance of data on group membership in a case where businesses
are not required to collect it (non-mortgage loans) is examined by Winnie Taylor,
ProvingRacialDiscriminationandMonitoringFairLending Compliance: The
Missing Data Problem in Nonmortgage Credit, 31 REV. BANK. & FIN. L. 199,
244 (2010-2011). Taylor concludes that "[w]hen lending discrimination plaintiffs
are unable to compare themselves to others who may be or are similarly situated,
their claims will routinely fail."
o Ghent et al., supranote 25.
5 Avery et al., supra note 26.
52 Bartlett et al., supra note 5.
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discriminate against customers in that class, that is, to
practice statistical discrimination.
(2) The scholarly literature indicates that racial and ethnic discrimination have by no means disappeared in
housing and mortgage markets.
(3) Disparate-impact discrimination is generally more
difficult to detect than disparate-treatment and may
therefore be the preferred behavior for businesses with
an incentive to practice statistical discrimination-and
with no qualms about doing so.
(4) Disparate-impact discrimination can arise from a
scoring scheme that is based on a statistical analysis that
omits variables indicating membership in a protected
class. This omission may be motivated by a business's
attempt to be "neutral." However, because membership
in a protected class is correlated with many of the variables included in this analysis, this perceived neutrality is
an illusion. Instead of preventing disparate-impact discrimination, this approach may inadvertently build it
into the business's scoring scheme.
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